Introduction
Rules of origin are an important aspect of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). They The relevance of rules of origin in recent preferential trade schemes has spawned a new formal literature. This includes exploration of the importance of rules of origin for the political economy of regional agreements (Duttagupta and Panagariya 2001) , as well as the impact of rules of origin on outside country access to internal markets (Ju and Krishna 1998) . Other work of this type includes Falvey and Reed (1998) and Krishna and Krueger (1995) .
The roots of rules of origin regimes can be found in the relative complexity of PTAs vis-à-vis customs unions. For example, because free trade agreements (FTAs) do not have a common external tariff, the risk exists that goods will be diverted through the lowest FTA-partner tariff and into the FTA block. Because of this possibility, one stated reason for rules of origin is that they are designed to ensure that only goods produced within a free trade block actually receive free trade treatment. At least, that is the theory. 1 In practice, assigning the origin of a product is not simple, as value added is sometimes included and sometimes not, local content thresholds vary, and products can and do lose their FTA origin as they cross borders. In addition, the assignment of origin is clearly subject to political factors, much like contingent protection.
In Europe, a regime of "Pan-European cumulation," entered into force on 1 January 1997. It originally applied in all of the EEA countries (Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, the UK, Ireland, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece), in Switzerland (EFTA member), and in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia. Turkey joined in late 1999, 2 and is working to implement the regime. The European rules require that the inputs in fact originate within the free trade area. Otherwise, processing requirements in the rules of origin have to be complied with if the finished product is to have free trade status. A similar arrangement for the Mediterranean countries is due to take effect by 2010.
In the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the rules of origin state that a product originates in the free trade area when it is wholly produced or substantially transformed in the free trade area. Substantial transformation occurs when processing causes a product to shift from one tariff classification to another. NAFTA rules of origin include a "de minimis" provision that permits a final NAFTA good to contain a small quantity of the same kind of good from a non-NAFTA source (up to 7 percent of the value of each shipment, or 9 percent in the case of cigarettes and cigars). The motor vehicle sector was heavily involved in the design of the NAFTA rules of origin, and from the beginning it was clear that their purpose was to provide additional protect to intermediate parts producers and to increase costs for integrated operations owned by Japanese automakers.
Much of the literature on rules of origin works from the premise of homogenous goods. This is in keeping with a large part of the literature on trade creation and diversion under PTAs. In contrast, this paper is concerned with rules of origin in the context of Ethier-type two-way trade in differentiated intermediate goods (Ethier 1979 (Ethier , 1982 . Such differentiation of intermediates is an important aspect of recent division of labor models of trade, geography, and growth (Francois and Nelson 2002 
Analytical Expectations
In this section the impact of PTAs on intermediates trade is explored in an analytical framework involving Ethier-type two-way trade in differentiated intermediates (Ethier 1979 (Ethier , 1982 This allows us to take world prices as given at actual equilibrium values as we examine a given set of countries, and to then focus on differences across PTA country pairs within the equilibrium price set as implied by differences in rules of origin. We are able to then isolate expected intra-PTA differences related directly to rules-based costs for use of non-PTA intermediates.
We focus on three countries, indexes by i=1…3. Countries 1 and 2, on impose an PTA that leaves out country 3. Country 3 represents the rest-of-world region vis-à-vis countries 1 and 2, and is represented in the system by world prices representing the trade equilibrium price set. For both countries 1 and 2, we assume a transformation technology g(.) that maps production of the numeraire good wheat, represented by W, and intermediate factor bundles, represented by b, used in the production of manufactured goods, both as inputs to intermediate input production and as value added.
Formally, our transformation technology is represented by equation (1). It has the usual properties of convexity.
(
Assuming W is homogenous, we set the intra-PTA price of wheat at unity, and give it the job of serving as numeraire. We can then represent the supply price of bundles (assuming competitive factor markets) as an artifact of the transformation technology.
These are formalized in equations (2) and (3).
We next turn to intermediate goods. We are interested in two-way trade in intermediates. In reduced form, we will have a mapping from bundles prices to prices for composite intermediates. This is represented in equation (4). The h-function in equation (4) 
In working with equation (4), we assume that we generally operate on the concave region of the product transformation surface, which simply means that the curvature of the g(.)
function in equation (1), which reflects opportunity costs for bundles vis-à-vis wheat, dominates reduced-form scale effects as embodied in the h function over the range of relevant equilibria. When this is not the case we will be in unstable equilibria, with stability ultimately either involving equilibria like those we have just assumed, or else corner solutions. Under constant returns, the h function would simply be a linear operator.
We are concerned with the impact of PTAs on trading costs as manifested as reduced-form trading costs. As such, we introduce them here as a markup on the cost of intermediates for final goods producers.
In equation (5),
represents the trading-cost inclusive price of intermediates from region k when used in region i to produce a good for region j, given trading costs
For final goods production in the manufacturing sector, we assume a CES-based production function, defined over value added measured directly in units of bundles, and in terms of composite regional intermediate goods. In dual form, the cost function for a regional manufactured good is then as represented in equation (6).
In equation (6), the ω terms are exponential CES-weights from the underlying CES production function. In the dual context shown here, they serve as inverse cost weights for mapping input prices into final good prices.
Note that with constant returns under a CES production technology involving value-added and assembly, we implicitly assume that production can be separated between production for home, partner, and ROW markets to reflect relative input cost variations as detailed below. This means we can index cost of production of Y by destination market. Again, we are also interested in potential trading costs, and so again introduce a trading cost wedge on final goods.
In equation (7) ) , ( ) , (
P denotes the producer price of good Y produced in region i for consumption in region j while
denotes the consumer price of the same good given final-good trading cost
From equation (6), and the first-order conditions for cost-minimization in Y production, we also can map composite intermediate input demand to relative internal prices and the total quantity produced. This is represented below in equation (8). (8) m
denotes intermediates produced in region k and used in region i for final goods production destined for region j. We can make a similar derivation for total value-added VA, represented by equation (9) below. (9) VA
When we combine intermediates demand and value added we then have total demand for factor bundles in the manufacturing sector. This is shown in equation (10),
where the h function represents the primal mapping technology in equation (4) from factor input bundles employed in m production to m itself.
(10)
Turning to final demand, we assume CES preferences defined over regional final manufactured goods. Since income itself can be mapped from the price of bundles, regional demand for regional varieties will be a function of the vector of goods prices within a national economy P and also of bundles prices. In total (and assuming thirdcountry demand for regional goods is also a function of price in the observed equilibrium), total demand for regional varieties will be a function of the degree of substitution between varieties, as measured by the substitution elasticity ε, and of the price vectors for final goods and bundles. (1)- (11) give us 11 sets of functional relationships that determine a comparable set of unknowns:
We now turn to the differential impact of FTAs and CUs. For a starting point, we assume a customs union within the framework spelled-out above, meaning identical external tariffs and free movement of all goods internally. With this regional integrated equilibrium as the benchmark for the country pair, we then move to introduce trading costs to reflect the introduction of rules of origin, which characterizes an important difference in practice between FTAs and customs unions. Assuming that these rules are binding, then in reduced form we will see an increase in the effective cost of using intermediates from outside the CU/FTA (see equation 5), which can in turn be mapped to an effective increase in the inverse cost weights (i.e. a drop in the weights) in equation (8). How the increase is realized depends on how the rules are operationalized. They could range from a sliding scale involving tariffs on third-country inputs to tariffs on the whole product (including FTA inputs and value added). In practice these rules are constantly evolving. For our purposes here, we simply assume that third-country intermediates used for internally traded final goods effectively cost more to use once we introduce rules of origin. The implication of such a change is immediately clear from equation (12) below, which is derived from equation (8). Equation (12) defines the relative input mix of intermediates, by country of origin, as a function of relative input costs. With the consequent shift in the cost of using third-country inputs, as they imply a cost increase related to some financial penalty like loss of duty-free treatment for the final good, we will see a downward shift in the relative importance of third-country intermediates, and a shift toward FTA-originating inputs. Hence, there will be a shift toward intermediates that are internally produced, and away from third county intermediates.
Depending on the specific form of the rules or origin and related penalties, such a shift would be made to the point where the marginal value of product of imported thirdcounty inputs exceeds penalty costs. For the present exercise (and the empirics that follow), the important point is just the end result. There will be a shift toward FTA inputs, if all other factors are held fixed.
At the same time, CUs themselves can involve lower cross-border trading costs than FTAs. For example, the European Union, with its single market program, has led to the dismantling of border posts across Europe, and to cross-border cooperation to speed the clearing of goods. This has the effect of reducing the cost of using internal inputs. The obvious contrast is to the border crossing-points within NAFTA, where FTA inputs still have to clear border checks. This effect will work in the opposite direction from rules of origin. In our controlled analytical experiment, where we only introduce rules of origin on an otherwise clean slate, the impact will be a relative shift toward internal intermediates. However, when we move from our hypothetical world to actual data, we will also expect to see a rising border cost as we shift from a CU to an FTA. This would imply a rising cost for use of internal intermediates, so that the shift may be in the opposite direction. The net effect is an empirical question.
A second impact of this increase in the effective cost of external inputs (relative to our integrated customs union benchmark equilibrium) will be to increase the cost of producing final manufactured goods for export to the relevant CU/FTA partner. This is shown in equation (13) below for exports from Country 1 to Country 2, which follows from manipulation of equation (6).
Assuming CES demand for the final manufactured good, we will then also have a version of equation (12) that involves final goods.
Since we translate rules of origin into increases in the cost of using non-FTA intermediates when producing goods for sale to an FTA partner, 8 from equation (13) 
"
This in turn can be manipulated, by dividing through our definition of
, to yield the percent change in intermediate demand.
Finally, dividing through by relative price changes, and making a substitution from equation (15), we arrive at an elasticity representation of the impact of rules-induced non-FTA intermediate goods price increases on the use of intermediates for FTA partner-destined final goods.
In the context of a given set of world equilibrium prices, deviations in internal prices from world benchmark prices are directly defined by deviations in the effective trading cost imposed by rules of origin.
This in turn means that equation (18), following a substitution from equation (19), yields the impact of such trading costs on intermediate input demand.
Note that in equation (20), we have also taken advantage of equation (19), which implies 
Consider next the impact on relative final product demands, and hence on relative trade shares for final products. Again, assuming CES final demands, the shift in relative final goods demand follows directly from the definition of the substitution elasticity, this time from equation (14).
represents the elasticity of relative final product demand for goods consumed in region 1, with respect to a rules-induced change in the cost of using intermediates from country 2 (an FTA partner) to produce goods for consumption in region 1. Again, we have taken advantage of the relationship of rules-induced costs to prices, given that we are working in the context of a given set of world equilibrium prices. Consider next the impact on actual rather than relative trade flows. This follows from final product demand elasticities, and the impact of rules-based trading costs for intermediates on the price of final goods (from equation 15).
Taken together, equations (20) and (23) say that we expect a drop in intra-FTA trade in final goods under increasingly restrictive rules of origin.
Next, we turn to the cross-price effects of rules-induced trade costs on intra-FTA demand for intermediate inputs. We again start from equations (5) and (8).
Differentiating equation (8) for cross-price effects yields equation (24). (25), which can then be summarized in elasticity form as in equation (26).
In Equation (26) (23) and (26), we then have the following result:
, ,
Starting with a customs union as a benchmark, these results imply a set of stylized shifts in the pattern of production and trade that can be expected if we observe different rules of origin across pairs of countries within a given global trading equilibrium. These can be summarized as follows. Country 2, this ratio will fall, since even if exports of intermediates fall, they will fall at less than any drop in total targeted production of final goods for Country 1 in the Country 2 industry (because of offsetting substitution effects). We can say the same thing for comparable FTA imports of final goods and exports of intermediates between Country 2 and Country 1. However, when we look strictly at bilateral exports of Country 1 to Country 2, or Country 2 to Country 1, we have an ambiguity following from Observations 1 and 4. We summarize these results as follows: In all fairness, when moving from theory to empirics, these results must be approached with caution. By construction, CUs and FTAs involve a great deal more than just rules of origin. They are packages that can include harmonization and mutual recognition of standards, acceleration of customs clearance procedures, and deregulation of foreign direct investment. Such regime shifts and policy differences, which have been effectively sterilized in this section, can be quite dramatic, and may outweigh the direct effects of rules of origin in the data.
Motor Vehicles and Parts

a. The data
We next turn to a more formal empirical assessment. This involves data on the value of motor vehicles trade from UNCTAD's COMTRADE dataset for 2001, supplemented with estimates of bilateral tariff rates taken from World Bank's WITS dataset. The data are for trade in motor vehicles, represented by SIC (rev1) 732, which is all motor vehicles and parts, and SIC 7328 (rev 1), which is motor vehicle parts only. We have relatively complete data for bilateral trade between 27 OECD Member and associate countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, and the United States. These countries cover a range of preferential arrangements. In addition to the NAFTA (U.S., Canada, Mexico), and the European Union, we also have FTAs within Europe through EFTA (Norway and Switzerland), the European Economic Area (EFTA and the EU, but without Switzerland), and an EU-Turkey customs union. In addition, the EU has extended FTA status to the East European economies in this period (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic), as has EFTA. Japan, Korea, and Australia are left out of these arrangements entirely (though Australia and New Zealand have an FTA).
Critically, since roughly 1997, the EU has also negotiated a set of European accumulation rules on most though not all of its FTA partners. As a result, many countries that were in a hub-and-spoke arrangement with the EU now benefit from Europe-wide rules of origin, with the net effect being a relatively large Europe-wide FTA, with the EU15 at the center. The implementation of the arrangement, however, excluded Turkey at the time, though it did include candidate countries (the new 10 EU Members). In short, the cross-section provides a nice sample of rules of origin arrangements.
b. Regression Model and Results
We are interested in the apparent relationship between FTA vs. customs union membership, on the one hand and hence the assumed or explicit application or nonapplication of rules of origin, and on the other hand the pattern of trade and the relative importance of intermediate and final product trade as outlined in Section 2 above. Our focus will be on the relative importance of individual partners for trade in motor vehicles and parts. By implication, and as summarized above in Section 2, a shift toward traded intermediates also implies a shift in production toward intra-FTA intermediates.
We define an index for intermediates trade, ζ1. This measures the relative importance of a trading partner in total imports of intermediates.
(28) (29)
From Observation 3 above, we expect ζ1 to rise for an FTA imposing binding rules of origin, relative to an otherwise comparable customs union.
We are also interested in the composition of final vs. intermediates goods trade.
In theory, restrictions on the use of intermediates should cause the relative importance of parts to rise within an FTA. This assumes we hold final goods protection constant.
However, in practice the forces that drive protection of intermediates will also drive rules-based protection of final goods production. Hence, the net effect really is theoretically ambiguous. To measure these relative effects, we introduce a second index, which is the ratio of intermediate imports to final good imports.
From observation 7, this effect will be ambiguous.
An econometric model is estimated for both indexes above. Since the z1 index is a share, a logistic transformation is first performed. Two samples are covered in the estimates in Tables 1 and 2 . One is a sub-sample, restricted to European countries with free trade either as part of the European Union, or as part of various European FTAs, all subject to pan-European accumulation rules. The second set of regressions involves a full sample of OECD countries as both importers and/or exporters. Right hand side variables are explained in the tables.
Starting with the share of total intermediates trade ( Estimated are based on OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Since left-hand side variables are measured as shares, dependant variables in the regressions are logistic transformations of the original share terms. t-ratios are given in parentheses "( )" with significance levels in italics. For the first regression, sample is restricted to EU Members and countries that have otherwise implemented pan-European accumulation rules
